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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
ANDREW BRINK, : Case No. 20060954-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant/Defendant Andrew Brink appeals from a final judgment of conviction 
for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(2003), entered by the Honorable Sheila K. McCleve, Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2) (j) (2002). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to allow Brink to 
introduce expert testimony specific to the facts of this case in support of his identification 
defense where identification was the central issue? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's decision to exclude the expert's testimony is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ^ |665 44 
P.3d794. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 56-72, 85-86, 144-288, 289, 
393, 395:93-96. 
RELEVANT RULE PROVISION 
The text of the following rule is relevant to the issue on appeal. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 19, 2006, the State charged Brink with one count of Aggravated 
Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. R. 1-9. On 
March 29, 2006, Brink gave notice of his intent to call Dr. David Dodd, an expert witness 
on eyewitness identification. R. 42. The state filed a motion in limine to exclude the 
expert testimony. R. 73-84. Brink filed a memorandum in support of the expert's 
testimony. R, 56-72. On May 10, 2006, the trial court held a hearing where Dr. David 
Dodd was questioned about the testimony he would offer. R. 393. The hearing was 
continued until May 15, where three of the state's witnesses were questioned about the 
robbery. R. 394. On June 1, 2006, the trial court granted the state's motion to exclude 
the expert's testimony. R. 289. 
A jury trial was held June 6 and 7 where Brink was found guilty of aggravated 
robbery. R. 305, 325, 395, 396. On June 12, Brink filed a motion for arrest of judgment. 
2 
R. 366-67. The state opposed the motion for arrest of judgment. R. 368-73. On 
September 25, 20065 Brink was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than 6 
years to life in the Utah State Prison. R. 377. A timely notice of appeal was filed on 
October 16, 2006. R. 379-80. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACT 
On October 5, 2005, two men armed with guns took money from the Breathe Day 
Spa located in Sugarhouse. R. 2, 395. The following testimony about the robbery was 
given by witnesses at trial. R. 393, 394, 395, 396. 
Alicia Warnock: In the evening of October 5, 2005, Warnock had just finished a 
spa treatment at the Breathe Day Spa located in Sugarhouse. R. 395:13-14. Warnock 
went to the front of the store near the double glass front doors with Amber, an employee, 
to discuss some products with her. R. 395:16-17. It was dark outside but there was some 
lighting outside the front door. R. 395:16-17. Warnock noticed two men right outside the 
front doors "scoping out the place." R. 395:17. The two men caught Warnock's eye 
because they did not appear to be typical of those that attend spas. R. 395:17. The 
individuals looked "anxious" as they stood by the front door. R. 395:18. Warnock 
testified that one of the individuals was wearing a navy blue sweatshirt with a navy blue 
bandana or hat and the other was wearing a white or gray sweatshirt with a white 
bandana. R. 395:18, 27-28. Warnock described the man in navy blue as Hispanic with a 
"skinny" build and a dark goatee. R. 395:27. The man in white Warnock described as 
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"white, 22 years old, 5' 10, 160" pounds with a "skinny build" wearing a gray hooded 
sweatshirt and black pants/jeans. R. 395:28. Wamock thought that they must be 
boyfriends of the girls that worked there so she put it out of her mind and began speaking 
with Amber again. R. 395:18. 
The individuals did not have their faces covered while they stood outside the door. 
R. 395:21. Warnock was able to see the face of the individual in the white bandana and 
identified him in court as Brink. R. 395:21-23. However, Warnock had previously been 
unable to identify Brink from the photo spread shown to her by Detective Shoney. R. 
395:106. On the stand, Warnock denied having been shown a photo spread by Detective 
Shoney where she was unable to identify Brink as the suspect. R. 395:25, 105-06. 
Warnock testified that she was only shown a photo spread with Timothy Dorrell and was 
able to point him out as the first suspect. R. 395:25. However, Detective Shoney testified 
that he had shown the photo spread with Brink in it to Warnock and she was unable to 
identify anyone from it. R. 395:106. 
When Warnock looked back at the men, they started to open the door and come 
inside. R. 395:18. As the individual in the white bandana came in, he used his arm to 
cover his face. R. 395:21. As the men entered through the front doors they held "small, 
black handguns" waist high. R. 395:19, 30. The man wearing navy blue told Warnock 
and Amber to step aside and took them to the sitting area within the spa. R. 395:20. The 
sitting area was off to the side of the counter with the register and consisted of an area 
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with a wall of product through which one cannot see. R. 395:20, 30. The other 
individual went to the cash register. R. 395:19. The individual in the navy blue stated to 
Wamock and Amber that he "was new at this, so just do what I say," R. 395:20. This 
individual kept telling the women to look down but Warnock, who works for a bank, kept 
looking at the individual "for clues." R. 395:21. Warnock testified that she saw the 
individual in white accept the money and the individuals left. R. 295:24. The robbery 
took between 15 to 20 seconds according to Warnock. R. 295:24. 
Octavia Martucci: On the evening of October 5, 2005, Martucci was working the 
front retail desk at Breathe Day Spa. R. 395:62. Martucci first noticed something was 
wrong when a man with a white bandanna on his head holding a "silver" gun in one hand 
and using his other arm to cover his mouth told her to "give [him] the money." R. 
395:63, 77, 82. Martucci described this individual in her police report as "white," 
"skinny," "120" pounds, "between 16 and 25" years of age, and "about 5*8."" R. 395:81. 
Martucci noticed that another man had also come in with the individual asking for money 
and he was wearing "a blue sweatshirt and a blue cap [or beany]." R. 395:65, 77. 
Martucci described the second individual as "white, about the same age, 16 to 25, about 
5'6," "scruffy shaved" and about 120 pounds. R. 395:81-82. 
After being asked for money, Martucci walked to the end of the counter and took 
money out of the register. R. 395:64. The man in the white bandanna stood across from 
counter at an angle 3 or 4 feet away from Martucci. R. 395:67. However, in Martucci's 
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police report she wrote that she had given the money to the individual wearing the blue 
beany. R. 395:80. Martucci testified that she removed between $400 and $450 from the 
register and handed it to the man in the white bandanna. R. 395:67. The man took his 
arm away from his face and took the money from Martucci. R. 395:68. As Martucci 
gave the man the money she made eye contact with the individual. R. 395:69. However, 
Martucci testified that her focus was primarily on the individual's gun during this 
incident. R. 395:69, 84 Martucci testified she "was very scared" and that this was a very 
frightening and traumatic experience. R. 395:69, 84. 
The man in the white bandana told everyone to get on the ground so they moved to 
the waiting area and got on the ground. R. 395:70. The men then left the spa. R. 395:70. 
The individuals continued to lie on the ground for a few seconds then locked the front 
doors and called police. R. 395:70. About a week later Detective Bumingham showed 
Martucci a lineup of photographs. R. 395:72. The detective told Martucci to put a box 
around the individual who looked familiar to her and sign her name by it. R. 395:73. 
Martucci testified that the detective told Martucci that the individual from the robbery 
may or may not be in the photographs. R. 395:73. However, at the motion hearing she 
testified that she couldn't recall the detective giving her that cautionary instruction. R. 
395:86. About a minute later, Martucci identified Brink from the photo lineup as the 
person who committed the robbery. R. 395:73, 74. 
The detective asked Martucci to rate how sure she was that Brink was the 
6 
individual in question: Martucci stated her certainty was about a seven out often. R. 
395:74. Martucci testified that she wasn't "so accurate at that time" but became more 
certain over time each time she saw Brink, R. 395:74-76. Martucci became more 
convinced it was Brink when she saw him at the preliminary hearing sitting at defense 
table in his jail clothes. R. 395:87. Then again at the motion hearing and finally at trial, 
Martucci testified that she was now "very certain" Brink had committed the robbery. R. 
395:76, 88. To explain the discrepancies between her police report and testimony, 
Martucci testified that she filled the police report out right after the incident when she was 
frightened and frazzled. R. 395:90. However, after she has had time to think about the 
incident her mental state is clearer. R. 395:90-91. 
Sunni Jackson: Jackson was working the retail counter with Martucci on the 
evening of October 5, 2005. R. 396:116, 120. Two individuals entered the spa. R. 
396:118. One of the individuals was wearing a gray sweatshirt and a white bandanna on 
his head and the other was wearing a dark blue sweatshirt. R. 396:118-19. Jackson 
estimated that the individual with the white bandanna weighed 170 pounds, age 17 to 22 
and 5'11". R. 396:124, 126. Jackson described the individual in the dark sweatshirt as 
tall and skinny weighing about 150-60 pounds. R. 396:124. The individual wearing the 
white bandanna approached the counter and said to Jackson twice to "Give me all your 
money." R. 396:121, 126. At first, Jackson wasn't paying attention but she heard a 
"click" and then saw that the individual was pointing a "gray" gun at her and Martucci. 
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R. 396:121, 123-24. The individual held his arm over his face to obscure it. R. 396:121, 
126. Jackson was not able to get a good look at this individuals face and was therefore 
unable to identify him. R. 396:127. The individual wearing a dark sweatshirt was 
standing closer to the cash register. R. 396:121. The individual in the dark sweatshirt 
had Amber and Warnock sitting down in the waiting area off to the side. R. 396:122, 
126. Jackson then testified that she indicated in her police report that Martucci gave the 
money in the register to the individual in the dark sweatshirt. R. 396:123. Jackson 
testified that her heart was racing and she was nervous when filling out the police report 
after the robbery. R. 396:125. 
Detective Burningham: On October 7, 2005, Detective Burningham received 
information from a detective in another agency about a possible suspect. R. 395:34. 
Detective Burningham had been told that Timothy Dorrell had confessed to the robbery 
and had named the second suspect as Andy. R. 395:2, 34, 41. The detective was told that 
Andy could be located at an apartment building on 130 South 300 East. R. 395:35. The 
detective was told that Andy lived on the bottom floor of that apartment building across 
from the laundry room. R. 395:35. 
Detective Burningham went immediately to that location to investigate and obtain 
an apartment number. R. 395:36. The detective discovered that Brink and his girlfriend 
lived at the apartment. R. 395:36. Detective Burningham, with the assistance of another 
detective, returned to the apartment and made contact with Brink. R. 395:36-37. After 
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making contact and questioning Brink for awhile, the detectives took him back to the 
station for further questioning. R. 395:38. Brink was questioned at the station about the 
robbery for approximately two hours. R. 395:40. Brink admitted knowing Dorrell and 
that he had been with him at some point the night of October 5th. R. 395:41. However, 
Brink denied having any involvement with the robbery. R.395:49; 396:129. 
Dectective Burningham compiled photographs called a six-pack photo spread to 
show the witnesses. R. 395:43. Burningham testified that he picked five photographs 
"that are like appearance individuals, same race, same gender, same hair color, eye color, 
[and] age range" as Brink. R. 395:43. Burningham along with Detective Shoney went to 
Breathe Day Spa to show the photographs to Octavia and Sunni. R. 395:44. Burningham 
testified that when showing photographs to witnesses he typically instructs them "that the 
suspect that [they] are looking for may or may not be depicted, and they should not feel 
obligated to pick anybody." R. 395:45. Burningham testified that when showing the 
photographs they separated the witnesses, instructed them that the suspect may or may not 
be in the photos and to point someone out if they were fairly certain that they could. R. 
395:46. However on cross-examination, Burningham could not recall whether he had 
given this cautionary instruction when showing the photographs to Octavia. R. 395:51. 
Timothy Dorrell: Dorrell testified that he committed the robbery at Breathe Day 
Spa, that his accomplice was not Brink but a man by the name of Jeff Crisp. R. 392, 
395:99. At the preliminary hearing, Dorrell described Crisp as white, 5'9", scruffy beard, 
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19 years old. R.* 392:32-33. Dorrell was able to identify Crisp as his accomplice from an 
enlarged photograph shown to him. R. 395:99. Crisp has a similar build and features as 
Brink. R. 58, 392, 396. Dorrell testified that he gave the name "Andy" to police when 
questioned about the robbery because they "weren't getting along. [He] had to name 
somebody. [He] thought [he] could get off if [he] named somebody. So [he] just said 
Andy." R. 395:101, 102. Dorrell testified that he is currently serving a sentence at the 
Utah State prison for the robbery he pled guilty to committing. R. 395:101-03. 
Andrew Brink: Brink testified that he is a white male, 21 years of age, 5'8" and 
weighs 160 pounds. R. 396:129. Brink testified that although he cannot recall October 5, 
2005 completely, he was not involved in the robbery of Breathe Day Spa. R. 396:129. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Brink the opportunity to introduce 
expert testimony focusing on the specific facts in this case in support of his identification 
defense. Because the state's case rested almost entirely on the witnesses' identification, 
the jury's consideration of guilt or innocence depended on the weight they gave the 
testimony and how accurate they viewed the identification to be. Case law and studies 
continue to show that the average juror does not understand the fallibility of eyewitness 
identification and jurors' belief about eyewitness identification often is contrary to 
research findings. The expert's proffered testimony would not only have educated the 
jury on various general issues and pitfalls besetting identification testimony, but would 
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use specific analogies between the specific facts of this case and the circumstances and 
settings of studies of which he had knowledge. 
Relying on State v. Hubbard, the trial court, without analysis of the specific facts 
in this case, determined that Hubbard allowed a jury instruction in lieu of expert 
testimony if it concluded that the testimony would constitute a lecture to the jury. 2004 
UT App 211, 48 P.3d 953. The trial court determined that the expert's testimony did 
constitute a lecture and therefore could use jury instructions to educate the jurors. The 
trial court misapplied Hubbard to create a per se rule disallowing the use of the 
eyewitness identification testimony without ascertaining whether the specifics of this case 
required such testimony. In this case, the expert was prepared to testify about the facts 
specific to Brink's case that could have influenced the accuracy of the eyewitnesses' 
identification. Expert testimony would have been helpful to the jury since identification 
was the central issue, there is little other evidence linking Brink to the crime, and the 
expert testimony related to factors which could have affected the accuracy of the 
identification. It is likely, given the lack of evidence linking Brink to the robbery, that the 
exclusion of the expert's testimony had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
BRINK THE USE OF AN EXPERT WITNESS TO ASSIST THE JURY IN 
UNDERSTANDING THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
TESTIMONY. 
Eyewitness identification is the central issue in this case. Brink filed a "Notice of 
Expert Witness" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2003) intending to call Dr. 
David Dodd, a psychology professor at the University of Utah who specializes in 
eyewitness identification. R. 42. In a memorandum in support of Dr. Dodd's expert 
testimony regarding eyewitness identification, Brink argued that Dr. Dodd's testimony 
was necessary "to inform the jury not only about the psychological research on eyewitness 
identification, b u t . . . how the research applies to the specific factors of Ms. Martucci's 
identification of Mr. Brink." R. 60. Attached to the memorandum was a letter from Dr. 
Dodd indicating the information from this case that he had reviewed to form his expert 
opinion "on the basis of [his] knowledge of the research on eyewitness perception & 
memory" and his detailed analysis of the problems with the eyewitness identification in 
this case. R. 66; Addendum B. 
The state filed a motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony arguing that the 
"expert proposes to instruct the jurors on the general scientific principles, and then 
proposes to evaluate the testimony of Ms. Martucci in light of those principles. This 
would invade the province of the jury to asses credibility." R. 78. Instead, the state 
argued that its "proposed jury instructions have been specifically tailored to the issues in 
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this case, and would be the proper manner in which to address any deficiencies in the 
identification." R. 78. 
A motion hearing was held on May 10, 2006, where Dr. Dodd testified about 
eyewitness testimony and the three stages of memory: acquisition, retention and retrieval. 
R. 393. Dr. Dodd addressed studies and information regarding the impact on acquisition 
caused by disguises, duration of observation, fear or stress and weapon focus. R. 393. 
With regard to stress specifically, Dr. Dodd testified "that the public doesn't understand 
very well; that, when people are highly stressed, their mental processes are disrupted, and 
that includes acquiring information about what's going on around you and who it is that 
you're observing." R. 393:10-11. 
Dr. Dodd also testified concerning the retention stage and how suggestion "may 
alter the memory of the witness." R. 393:13. This is most common with the creation of 
photo spreads or line-ups and "what the witness believes about who he or she will see in 
the set of available alternatives." R. 393:13. Photo spreads that are put together with 
individuals that closely match the suspect as opposed to the description of the perpetrator 
"make it very hard for a witness to ever succeed" in picking the correct individual. R. 
393:14-15. Also, photo spreads that are done simultaneously, like in this case, as 
opposed to sequentially, make a witness "inclined to do a comparative judgment; that is, 
to look at the six and say, 'okay, of the six, which one looks like - most like the person I 
remember?'" R. 393:17. In regard to retrieval, Dr. Dodd testified that "every retrieval is 
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influenced by previous retrievals" so that the memory a witness has of a suspect from 
studying a lineup will "merge[] in some way with memory of the events at the time of the 
crime, and they will continue to make the same identification." R. 393:20. In addition, a 
copy of Dr. Dodd's detailed report of how these factors affect the eyewitness 
identification in this case was presented to the trial court. R. 66. 
The trial court granted the State's motion in limine to exclude Dr. Dodd's expert 
testimony. R. 289. The trial court, relying on State v. Hubbard, found that "Dr. Dodd's 
testimony would constitute a lecture to the jury." R. 289. However, the trial court did not 
support its decision with any reasoning. Instead, the trial court invited counsel to "submit 
instructions that they believe are appropriate in light of the evidence presented regarding 
eyewitness identification." R. 289. The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the 
expert testimony regarding the problems with eyewitness identification specific to this 
case and determining that a jury instruction could adequately educate the jury on the 
problems with eyewitness identification. Therefore, the trial court's decision should be 
reversed. 
Because the state's case rested almost entirely on the eyewitness testimony, "the 
jury's consideration of guilt or innocence . . . depend[ed] on the weight they g[a]ve to this 
testimony, including how accurate they view[ed] the testimony to be." State v. Maestas, 
2002 UT 123,1J22, 63 P.3d 621 (Durham, CJ. dissenting). However, instead of allowing 
jurors to hear expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification and 
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the fallibility and misconceptions by the public known to be associated with it, the trial 
court "cho[seJ to educate the jury through the use of appropriate instructions instead of 
through expert testimony." R. 289. While the jury instruction was "better than no 
education at all/5 it came after all the evidence was in, and could not adequately 
communicate to the jury all the concerns regarding the fallibility of the eyewitness 
identification specific to this case as could the expert's testimony when the jury was 
hearing the evidence and determining witness credibility. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^23. 
Utah R. Evid. 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. It states, "[i]f 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702. Hence, the test of the admissibility of an 
expert's testimony is whether it assists the trier of fact, or in other words, whether it is 
helpful. State v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ^ [69, 44 P.3d 794; State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
388, 398 n.8 (Utah 1989). 
In order to be "helpful," expert testimony must convey information which is not 
ordinarily within the knowledge of the average juror. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 
1361 (Utah 1993). 
In determining "helpfulness," the trial court must first decide 
whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average 
individual. It is not necessary that the subject matter be so erudite or arcane 
that the jurors could not possibly understand it without the aid of expert 
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testimony, nor is it a requirement that the subject be beyond the 
comprehension of each and every juror. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361 (citations omitted). In other words, "'expert opinion is proper 
when it would help to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, 
possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror5 . . . ." People v. Brooks, 
490 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1985) (additional citations omitted). 
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court recognized 
that correct information regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony is not within the 
knowledge of the average juror. Id, The Supreme Court reviewed the research regarding 
human memory and eyewitness identification, recognizing "human perception is inexact 
and that human memory is both limited and fallible." Id. at 488. Although the research 
shows that eyewitness identifications are often unreliable, "juries have a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the reliability of eyewitness identifications" and "because jurors do 
not appreciate the fallibility of such identifications, they often give eyewitness testimony 
undue weight." State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ^ [26, 984 P.2d 376. The Supreme Court 
warned that 
research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in 
eyewitness identification [;yet,] jurors are, for the most part, unaware of 
these problems. People simply do not accurately understand the deleterious 
effects that certain variables can have on the accuracy of the memory 
processes of an honest eyewitness. See K. Deffenbacher & E. Loftus, Do 
Jurors Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness Behavior?, 
6 Law and Human Behavior 15 (1982); J. Brigham, R. Bothwell, The 
Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness 
Identification, 7 Law and Human Behavior 19 (1983). Moreover, the 
16 
common knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to 
documented research findings. See Loftus, supra at 171-77. 
Long, 721 P.2d at 490. 
The increased awareness as to the fallibility of eyewitness identification created by 
the studies referenced in Long as well as the concern that jurors' common beliefs about 
the reliability of eyewitness identification may actually be contrary to the research 
findings led the Supreme Court to reassess its approach of the use of cautionary 
eyewitness identification instructions. Id. at 492. Because of the risk that eyewitness 
testimony would be given undue weight by uninformed and misguided jurors, the 
Supreme Court concluded "that, at a minimum, additional judicial guidance to the jury in 
evaluating such testimony is warranted" and "abandoned] [the] discretionary approach to 
cautionary jury instructions," instead directing that "trial courts shall give such an 
instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an 
instruction is requested by the defense." Id, 
The concerns about the fallibility of eyewitness identification expressed in Utah 
case law since the Long decision including studies regarding the significant number of 
wrongful convictions which have been based on faulty eyewitness identification 
testimony necessitate that a trial judge take into account the Supreme Court's teachings 
and do a careful analysis of whether a jury instruction can adequately communicate the 
information regarding the reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence which is 
counterintuitive to the average juror. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123, |^23 (Durham, C.J. 
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dissenting) (noting that the use of "new DNA identification techniques [have] 
conclusively established that eyewitnesses can be mistaken, for many reasons that are 
beyond the general knowledge and experience of the average juror5'); Michael R. Lieppe, 
The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y. & L. 
909, 923 (1995), (explaining that "[f]or a number of reasons, including data from 
empirical studies,... judge's instructions cannot be relied on to counter mistaken 
eyewitness identification"); Andrew R. Tillman, Expert testimony on Eyewitness 
Identification: The Constitution Says, "Let the Experts Speak," 56 Tenn.L.Rev. 735, 736 
(1989); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological 
Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 Psychol., Pub. Pol'y. & L. 765 (1995). Where, 
in cases like this, eyewitness identification is a central issue and the expert's testimony 
will focus on the specific facts of the case in relation to the scientific evidence regarding 
the reliability of the eyewitness identification, trial courts should allow the expert to 
testify. 
Not only is such evidence helpful to a jury, it is essential to a defendant's ability to 
present a defense since without such testimony, a jury's misconceptions rather than 
relevant evidence could determine the outcome. "Jurors, as well as defendants, are 
entitled to the information experts on human memory can provide about its operation." 
Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^ [19 (Durham, C.J. dissenting). In the present case, expert 
testimony would be helpful to the jury since identification is the central issue, there is 
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little other evidence linking Brink to the crime, and the expert testimony related to factors 
which could have affected the accuracy of the identification. 
Instead of allowing expert testimony to educate and focus the jury's attention on 
the limitations of eyewitness identification specifically from the facts of this case, the trial 
court determined that 
[w]hile the Court finds that it would not be an abuse of discretion to admit 
Dr. Dodd's testimony, the Court finds State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 
P.3d 953 particularly persuasive on this issue. In Hubbard, the court found 
that when an expert's testimony would "constitute a lecture, the substance 
of which can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury through the judge in 
a jury instruction, as opposed to through expert testimony," it is entirely 
appropriate for the trial judge to choose to instruct the jury instead of 
allowing expert testimony. Id. at YJ17-18. In the present case, the Court 
finds that Dr. Dodd's testimony would constitute a lecture to the jury and, 
therefore, the Court chooses to educate the jury through the use of 
appropriate instructions instead of through expert testimony. 
R. 289. 
The trial court determined "that Long instructions may not adequately address all 
of the problems inherent with eyewitness testimony . . . . " and "following Hubbard's 
admonition" "invite[d] counsel to submit instructions that they believe are appropriate in 
light of the evidence presented regarding eyewitness identification." R. 289. The trial 
court's decision does not explain why or state a basis on how Dr. Dodd's testimony 
"would constitute a lecture to the jury" but instead appears to rely on the Hubbard opinion 
as creating a per se rule allowing it to keep out expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification regardless of its content and simply give a jury instruction. The trial court 
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fails to do any independent analysis of the specific facts of this case in making its 
determination regarding how jury instructions are sufficient to adequately educate the jury 
on the expert's knowledge which is counterintuitive to the average juror. This is 
especially problematic given the very things that studies show effect the accuracy of 
witness identification—fear, weapon focus, duration, photo spread line up, and 
certainty—were present in this case. 
The trial court's use of Hubbard to exclude expert testimony was specifically 
addressed by the Supreme Court when it explicitly warned against the adoption of a "per 
se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification." 
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,114; see also Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ^68. Furthermore, the trial 
court's reliance on Hubbard is misplaced because Hubbard is a case, unlike this one, 
where the expert's testimony did not focus on the specific facts of the case but rather 
focused generally on the research and literature surrounding eyewitness identification. 
In Hubbard, the defendant sought to have an expert testify "regarding the fallibility 
of eyewitness identification testimony." IdL at f 9. The trial court held a hearing to 
determine whether the testimony was admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 702 and 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). Id The testimony from the expert that the 
defendant sought to admit at trial 
pertain[ed] to research and theory concerning memory, the reporting of 
memory, and the variables known to influence memory and memory 
reports. The testimony is designed to provide scientific information that 
may assist the trier of fact in interpreting contested adjudicated facts; 
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statements of witnesses as to who and what they saw and happened. 
Id 
None of the testimony sought to be admitted addressed the problems with the 
eyewitness identifications specific to the case but simply outlined the general problems 
with eyewitness identification. See id. at | 9 n.l; compare State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 
59, (^44, 27 P.3d 1133 (no abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony where expert 
was not familiar with the defendant or fact of the case). The trial court denied the 
defendant's motion stating that in this case permitting the expert to testify "was not 
'required or advisable'" because "it 'would have a significant tendency to cause the jury 
to abdicate its role as fact finder, at least with respect to any issues that must be decided 
based on eyewitness testimony." Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, f^lO. Instead, informing the 
"jury regarding the problems with eyewitness identification is 'best accomplished through 
[an] instruction.'" Id On appeal, the Supreme Court began its analysis by noting it 
"ha[s] not adopted a per se rule of inadmissibility of expert testimony regarding 
eyewitness identification," but has left the admission of such testimony to the discretion 
of the trial court. Id.at^fl4. Citing Butterfield, the Court reasoned that when the 
substance of the experts testimony is regarding the "scientific bases and research 
underlying the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification" which can be 
"adequately conveyed to the jury" through an instruction it is left to the trial court's 
discretion to determine whether the testimony would constitute a lecture or not. Id. at 
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TJ17. In that case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving a cautionary Long 
instruction rather than permitting the expert to testify because the instruction could "better 
explain[] the substance of the proffered expert testimony, namely the research and 
scientific principles underlying the limitations of eyewitness identification." IcL at [^19. 
In this case, the expert had specific knowledge of the facts of this case from 
reviewing the preliminary hearing, photo spreads, and police and witness reports. R. 66. 
Dr. Dodd's testimony would not only have educated the jury on various general issues 
and pitfalls besetting identification testimony, but would use specific analogies between 
the facts of this case and the circumstances and settings of specific studies of which he 
had knowledge. R. 66-72. As defense counsel argued below, Dr. Dodd's testimony was 
the only means by which Brink could fully and adequately present his defense. R. 56-65; 
394:43-53; 395:96. 
Excluding the expert's testimony in this case was an abuse of discretion because 
had Dr. Dodd been allowed to offer evidence to the jury regarding the fallibility of the 
eyewitness testimony, it is likely with the scant evidence linking Brink to the robbery, the 
jury's verdict would have been different. For example, the state's key witness, Martucci, 
testified regarding how her confidence that Brink was the robber increased every time she 
saw him throughout the trial process. R. 395. First, when the detective asked Martucci to 
rate how sure she was that Brink was the individual in question, Martucci stated she was 
about a seven out often. R. 395:74. Martucci testified that she wasn't "so accurate at the 
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time" but became more certain over time each time she saw Brink. R. 395:75-76. 
Martucci became more convinced it was Brink when she saw him at the preliminary 
hearing sitting at defense table in his jail clothes. R. 395:87. Then again at the motion 
hearing and finally at trial, Martucci testified that she was now "very certain" Brink had 
committed the robbery. R. 395:76, 88. Martucci explained that when she filled out the 
police report she was frightened and frazzled, however, after she had time to think about 
the incident her mental state was clearer. R. 395:90-91. 
While the jury instruction told the jury that it should be aware that "a witness who 
has previously made an identification is likely to become more confident in making 
subsequent identifications," had Dr. Dodd been allowed to testify he would have offered 
the jury evidence regarding faulty original identifications. Studies have shown that faulty 
original identifications based on suggestion either unintended or otherwise result in all 
subsequent identification being suspect. R. 69-71. Specifically, Dr. I )odd's proffer 
indicated that he would discuss studies showing how a witness over time through 
repeated exposure to the defendant within the criminal process becomes more confident 
that she has chosen correctly and how that identification is not necessarily accurate. R. 
69-72; 393:13-21. This evidence was especially relevant since Brink's defense was that 
the witnesses had mistaken him for Jeff Crisp who is similar in age, build and has similar 
facial features as Brink. 
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Dr. Dodd also proffered that he would testify regarding "weapon focus," stress, 
fear and the impairment on memory these can cause. This evidence was necessary for the 
jury to understand while evaluating the testimony of the witnesses who testified that they 
were extremely frightened during the robbery and focused on the gun. Dr. Dodd's 
testimony, rather than the jury instruction, would have been far more helpful to a jury in 
evaluating whether the witnesses were correct in their identification of Brink and was 
necessary to ensure that Brink received a fair trial. 
Dr. Dodd's specific proffered examples from studies would have clarified the 
evidence showing that under the factors present in this case, the reliability of eyewitness 
identification is suspect at best. A jury instruction in this case was inadequate to educate 
the jury regarding eyewitness fallibility and the average person's misconceptions about it. 
Here, Dr. Dodd was prepared to testify about the facts specific to Brinks case that could 
have influenced the accuracy of the eyewitnesses' identification. Because the state's case 
rested almost entirely on the eyewitness identification of Brink, it is likely that the 
exclusion of Dr. Dodd's testimony had "a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict." Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,1J43 (citations omitted). 
In sum, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert's testimony 
which focused on the specifics of this case, determining that the testimony would 
constitute a lecture to the jury. The trial court gave no reasoning or basis for its decision 
but simply found that Hubbard allowed a jury instruction in lieu of expert testimony if the 
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court found the testimony to be a lecture. Rather than ascertaining whether the specifics 
of this case required expert testimony as outlined in Hubbard, the trial court misapplied 
Hubbard to create a per se rule disallowing the use of the eyewitness identification 
testimony. Had Dr. Dodd been allowed to offer evidence to the jury regarding the 
fallibility of the eyewitness testimony in this case, it is likely with the little evidence 
linking Brink to the robbery, the jury's verdict would have been different. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant, Mr. Brink, respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction 
for aggravated robbery. 
SUBMITTED thisZfl day of February, 2007. 
\ ^ 
DEffiRA M.NELSON V 
JOHN WEST 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANDREW BRINK, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061900386 FS 
Judge: SHEILA K MCCLEVE 
Date: September 25, 2006 
PRESENT 
Clerk: nicolel 
Prosecutor: COLBY, MICHAEL S 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 20, 1984 
Video 
Tape Number: 9/25/06 Tape Count: 10:52 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 06/07/2006 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
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Case No: 061900386 
Date: Sep 25, 2006 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court recommends credit for time served. 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Concurrent to any other prison sentence defendant may be serving. 
Restitution Amount: $460.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: VICTIM 
This restitution is to be paid joint and severally with the 
co-defendants. 
Dated this 
Page 2 (last] 
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TabB 
Mr. John West, Attorney 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 E. 500 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dear Mr. West: 
Re: State of Utah v. Andrew Brink (Case No. 061900386) 
What follows is my expert opinion on the Andrew Brink case, formed on the basis 
of my knowledge of the research on eyewitness perception & memory. Information on 
the particulars of this case is formed entirely by the following relevant materials: 
Salt Lake Police Department Report (BB5769 Thursday October 13, 2005), pages 
1-12, 
Witness Reports from Octavia Martucci, Sunni Jackson, and Alicia Warnock, all 
date 10-5-2005. 
scripl^Hffie^^ - witnesses^ 
luir a ^ M r . Nofet: 
Photocopy of photos of 6 people shown in a photospread to several witnesses and 
signed by Ms. Martucci and Detective Burningham on 10-12-05 (The original 
photospread was shown to me by Detective Schoney on May 3rd) 
Transcript of preliminary hearing of February 23, 2006 (34 pages) consisting 
primarily of the testimony of Ms. Martucci. 
To date, I have testified in more than 20 trials in Utah and Colorado on 
eyewitness issues; my CV was previously provided to you. My testimony would focus 
very specifically on the factors that are relevant to the facts of this case in relation to 
eyewitness issues, particularly those relevant to the identification process. The existing 
research on eyewitness perception and memory has convincingly established that 
accurate identification is a process that involves a number of factors that unfold from the 
time of the initial observation to subsequent identifications, including identification and 
testimony at trial; some of these factors are relevant to this case and will be discussed. 
The research clearly shows that the process of identification often involves factors 
that are not well understood by lay people, that is, that take place differently than 
common sense indicates. Some of these factors are described in the discussion of 
factors that follows. Thus, as described in Loftus & Doyle,2 among the misconceptions 
'Deffenbacher & Loftus (1982). Do jurors share a common understanding 
concerning eyewitness behavior? Law and human behavior, 6, 15. 
2Loftus, E. F. & Doyle, J. M. (1997 and 2005 Cumulative Update). Eyewitness 
testimony: Civil and Criminal .(Third Edition) Charlottesville, Va.: Lexis Law 
Publishing 
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of lay people is that witnesses remember the details of violent events (or those where 
violence is threatened) better than those of nonviolent ones. Indeed, most people 
remember less well under violence (or threat). Further, while it is clear, consistent with 
common sense, that attention and time to observe are relevant to a witness's opportunity 
to acquire information, research shows that what a typical lay person might judge as an 
apparently reasonable attention and adequate time to observe are not necessarily 
sufficient to form an adequate memory, particularly for a person's face. 
Indeed, a very recent survey conducted by independent pollsters at Peter D. Hart 
Research Associates was summarized in an article for the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers; the poll shows that those surveyed (1,000 potential D. C. 
jurors) misunderstand human memory and eyewitness reliability in a number of ways. 
"Jurors overestimate the ability of people to remember strangers' faces..." seeing the 
process of seeing and remembering as much like making and replaying a video recording. 
Jurors also do not understand: a) the role of stress/violence as mentioned above, b) "the 
lack of any meaningful correlation between witness confidence at trial and witness 
accuracy," and c) that witnesses do more poorly at recognizing members of another race 
than their own race. Finally jurors do not understand how various police procedures 
during the identification process can affect witness accuracy (as also discussed in Loftus 
& Doyle,3, op cit.). 
Eyewitness testimony is dependent upon human perception & memory; it is 
therefore potentially unreliable, though it can, of course, be very reliable. There are now 
hundreds of research reports and dozens of published books detailing the factors that are 
influential in determining the degree of reliability or unreliability. The particular issue of 
face identification is well studied. The identification of someone well known to a witness 
is extremely fast and accurate, but the identification of someone only seen on one brief 
occasion is generally much less reliable. 
Memory experts, including eyewitness specialists, typically divide the process of 
memory into three broad stages: acquisition, retention, and retrieval.4 Acquisition is 
the stage in which the relevant information is encoded through the senses (sight and 
hearing). Retention involve the maintenance of the memory over time, a process 
influenced by the simple passage of time (forgetting) and by related events that may alter 
the original memory. Retrieval is calling up those memories, including the report of 
what is remembered and the recognition of whether this is the same person (face) seen 
before. 
Acquisition. 
Acquisition is the most critical and depends heavily upon many conditions, 
especially the opportunity to acquire the necessary information (including distance from 
the perpetrator and lighting), time duration, attentional processes, emotional state, etc. 
Reviewing the specifics of this case leads to several relevant factors: 
3 Loftus & Doyle, op cit., 2005 Cumulative Supplement, Sect. 1-6, Footnote 13.1 
4cf. Loftus, E. F. & Doyle, J. M. (1997, 2005), op cit. 
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Duration of Time. The total time of observation by Ms. Martucci is brief, but 
the actual time to observe the perpetrator's face is very brief, at least as indicated in the 
preliminary hearing, involving only the moments when the perpetrator's hand moved 
away from his face so that he could take the money.. Considerable research shows that 
the actual time available is typically overestimated by witnesses, typically in the range of 
two to ten times the amount of time actually demonstrated to have passed. 
What is acquired. Witnesses quickly acquire certain elements of the events and 
people involved. In this case, all of the witnesses describe two different suspects, each 
about the same height (5' 10" or a bit less) and weight (skinny, though Martucci's "120 
lbs" cannot be true). The witnesses all distinguish between: 
Suspect 1, a man wearing a blue sweatshirt, blue jeans, white tennis shoes, a 
scruffy shave or goatee, and (perhaps) a blue bandana. Notably the police report 
describes this man as "clean shaven," and 
Suspect 2, a man (darker in complexion and/or hair) wearing a gray sweatshirt 
and black pants, and (perhaps) a white bandana. 
These elements of a description are exactly the elements that are likely to be 
acquired in a brief observation where witnesses are attending to the person(s) involved. 
The witnesses also agree that one of the perpetrators was directly involved with 
Ms. Martucci and the cash register, while the other perpetrator held a customer and clerk 
under control in the sitting area at gun point. The witnesses agree that the perpetrator 
who took the money covered his mouth during all or most of the time the robbery was in 
progress. The police report indicates that his hand moved away from his mouth as they 
were leaving the building (p. 8 of SLC Police Dept. report), but Ms. Martucci indicates 
that this was when he received the money from her. Unfortunately the witness reports are 
sparse in certain respects, including the description of the suspects, other than that of 
clothing. This could be an indication that the face was not well encoded. 
The witnesses disagree about which of these two was Suspect 1 and which was 
Suspect 2. Ms. Martucci, in her handwritten report, has the man who took the money as 
Suspect 1. But Ms. Jackson and Ms. Devoge are clear that the man who covered his 
mouth (Jackson) and the man who took the money (Devoge) is the one described as 
Suspect 2. The police report describes Suspect 1 as the man who covered his mouth and 
took the money. 
While Ms. Martucci had the most direct contact with the man who took the 
money, the others had the most direct contact with the other man, the one who was 
holding them with a gun. So there is no particular reason to claim that Ms. Martucci is 
more accurate in keeping track of which man was which. 
Stress and Weapon Focus. The literature is clear that stress is disruptive of 
mental processes that are more complex, including acquiring information about a face. A 
recent study confirmed this about memory for identifying people by looking at military 
personnel put through mock interrogations. The study (a controlled experiment) shows 
that the personnel who are subjected to stress do worse at making identifications, even 
though their contact with the people to be identified was extended.5 The witnesses in the 
present case were under considerable stress because of the brandished weapons; each 
had a brief time to learn anything about the perpetrators and the only one to make an 
identification did so based on a very short view of the face and under stress related to the 
weapon. The reality of this effect of stress is one approach to explaining the confusion 
about which perpetrator was which. Thus the fact that the primary witness in the case is 
very clear about the person taking the money as Suspect 1 and the others as it being 
Suspect 1 who was holding them at gunpoint supports the argument that brief, threatening 
situations produce stress which, in turn, disrupts the formation of accurate memories. 
The issue of weapon focus is clearly present in this case, that is, the presenced of 
a weapon has been consistently shown to distract witness's attention from observing 
other elements of the person and situation. Thus the witness looks at the weapon since it 
is threatening, as demonstrated in a number of research studies. 
Disguise. The scientific literature on face identification is clear that alterations in 
the face, including disguises, significantly disrupt identification. The person who took 
the money was described as holding his arm over his face. Simple alterations of the face 
can have a very strong impact. Indeed, something as simple as having glasses on during 
exposure to a first seen person and off during the identification process can reduce 
accuracy greatly. 
Finally it should be noted that the acquisition stage is fundamental to any 
subsequent memory. Without adequate acquisition, there is no way that subsequent 
memory can be considered reliable. Indeed, research shows that weak acquisition is 
associated with susceptibility to suggestion and with an increased likelihood of false 
confidence in a witness's later retrieval. 
Retention 
The retention stage involves two primary factors, the passage of time and the 
presentation of other information which has the potential to alter the original memory. In 
most cases including this one, retention intervals are often followed by a retrieval which 
is followed by another retention interval followed by another retrieval, etc. 
A recent report from the National Institute of Justice (cited below as footnote 7 
and discussed in more detail in the text) is directed primarily at the process by which 
witnesses provide information about their retention through looking at pictures or lineups 
of potential perpetrators. Most of what follows about the photospread is based on those 
recommendations and the research that supports the recommendations. 
Alteration through suggestion. The intervention of additional information may 
alter the original memory, especially if that memory is weak. There is now a very large 
5 Anthony Doran, Brunswick, Maine, Gary Hoyt of Coronado, Calif., and Steven 
Southwick, M.D., senior author, Stephan Garrett, Paul Thomas, and Madelon 
Baranoski. International Journal of Psychiatry and the Law, Vol. 27/3: pp 265-279 
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body of research6 showing that suggestion can result in changes in "memory." Of 
particular concern in this case is the presentation of the photospread in that it is unclear 
how the photospread materials were compiled, namely whether the alternative choices are 
fair foils for the process. In addition, it is unclear what the Ms. Martucci expected at the 
time she was shown the photos. 
It is unclear from the available information what basis was used for creating a fair 
photospread. The scientific literature is specific that the fair process for selecting the 
entire set is to match "foils" to the physical description provided by the witness to the 
greatest extent possible. This literature also indicates that broad aspects of the physical 
description are quickly and accurately acquired, that is, some information is more rapidly 
and reliably acquired than are the details necessary to remember a face.; these would 
include information about approximate age, facial shape, facial hair, hair length and 
color. 
The police report does not indicate how these photos were selected in terms of 
apparent match to the description of either of the perpetrators other than "five like 
appearance males" (p. 8 of SL Police Dept report); and there is no mention of the 
discrepancy between the reports of the witnesses about which perpetrator held his hand 
over his mouth, etc. 
As Loftus and Doyle (op cit.) strongly point out, the importance of fairness in 
presenting lineups and photoarrays is that the selection initially made and publicly stated 
will be strongly held to by a witness, even when the choice is clearly shown to be 
incorrect. 
Also there is no information about what the witness was told (and what she 
expected) at the time the photospread was presented. Research has clearly established 
that witnesses are much more likely to select someone if they expect that the photos (or 
lineup) will include the perpetrator. Indeed, given a blank lineup (perpetrator absent), 
witnesses in research studies select a high percentage of the time. One study found that 
the false identification rate was 78% from a blank lineup when the witness believed the 
perpetrator would be in the set and was only 33% when told that the perpetrator may or 
may not be present. 7 
Finally it is important to know at what point her choice of the defendant was 
confirmed by the Detective who presented the photospread. Confidence is directly 
influenced by feedback that the witness has chosen the defendant, as demonstrated by a 
number of controlled experiments by Wells and his collaborators. 8 
6Cf. Loftus & Doyle, op cit., chapters 3 & 4. 
7 Malpass & Devine\ (1981), Guided Memory in Eyewitness Identification. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 66, 343-350. 
8 References to be inserted. 
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It is unclear whether the choice of photospread foils was suggestive and whether 
the witness's belief about whether the perpetrator would be in the set is also suggestive. 
But these two issues are the basis for strong concern about the fairness of the process. 
This issue is discussed further in the recommendations below. 
Retrieval 
The "final" stage of eyewitness memory is influenced by all of the previous 
factors, including several that relate to the nature of the retrieval process and its 
consequences. And since no identification was made then, this exposure to a face in the 
photospread may influence all subsequent identifications. 
Subsequent identifications. If a previous identification has beeft made based on 
suggestion, all subsequent identifications are suspect. The identification from, in this 
case, a photospread has provided a clear and careful look at the person who is the 
defendant, under optimal conditions, including time. This means that the person in the 
photospread will be identified, rightly or wrongly, in subsequent identifications. 
In-court identification. An in court identification is an event that occurs in 
virtually all criminal trials and is surely correctly made in the majority of cases. 
However, when the original identification is potentially faulty, the reliability of in court 
identification is an issue of concern. In court identification is essentially a showup, 
which is considered an improper procedure in the NIJ recommendations. Obviously an in 
court identification that has been preceded by an acceptably conducted identification 
under appropriate conditions is not as suspect as is an in-court identification preceded by 
a problematic previous identification. A showup of any kind is potentially very different 
than true identification, requiring very little similarity between the perpetrator and the 
defendant, and thus operating largely on the power of suggestion. The suggestion is of 
this sort: The only person sitting at the defense table who is not an attorney and who is 
similar to the perpetrator must be the perpetrator; that person is now on trial for the 
crime, that trial is a consequence of a process based on diligent police work; etc. 
Procedural recommendations from NIJ 
The analysis of criminal cases in which eyewitnesses are definitively proved 
wrong (described below) is a strong factor in many National Institute of Justice9 
recommendations (as discussed above) that focus heavily on the kinds of procedures 
followed in presenting photospreads and lineups, including providing the witness a fair 
set of photos among those presented, and the necessity of giving witnesses a strong 
caution that the real perpetrator may, or may not, be present among the choices. This 
case seems also to provide the ideal circumstances for the claim that sequential 
presentation is preferred over simultaneous presentation. Experts are in general 
agreement that the simultaneous presentation of a set of faces in a photospread (or in a 
lineup) leads to higher levels of errors as a result of the comparative judgement process. 
Seeing all of the faces at one time results in a process of comparing the choices and 
9National Institute of Justice. Eyewitness evidence: A guide for law enforcement. 
October 1999 
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narrowing them down to the one who looks most like the perpetrator (physical 
description or general appearance). The alternative is a sequential presentation in which 
the witness views one picture at a time and indicate "Yes" or "No" for each. Such a 
procedure also does not necessarily limit the set to 6 pictures since a larger set can be 
presented. Here it would be possible, then, to provide pictures that "match" both 
perpetrator descriptions among, perhaps, 10 or 12 photographs. 
The procedure should also include an immediate indication of witness confidence, 
provided before there is any feedback to the witness about whether their choice is 
consistent with police conclusions about who is the perpetrator. 
Finally, recommendations now being adopted by many states and cities include 
the importance of a "double blind" procedure, one in which the person administering 
does not know who, in the set presented, is the suspect. Such a recommendation does not 
impugn the integrity of police officers, but points to inadvertent cues in the presentation 
and subtle reactions of the administrator of the photospread (or lineup). Double blind 
procedures are demanded in medical and other scientific research as a check against these 
sorts of subtle information to patients, raters, etc. 
Witness Errors 
In relation to all of the above, it is valuable to note the dangers (and incidence) of 
mistakes in eyewitness identification in various circumstances. A paper by several 
experts in the field10 provides an analysis of 40 cases in which people previously 
convicted of felonies were exonerated based on subsequent DNA evidence. These were 
major crimes in which long sentences were common and most defendants had already 
served several years. The most common thread to the conviction was that eyewitness 
evidence was the sole or primary evidence in 90% of the cases. The incidence of such 
errors is a function of police procedures in interviewing witnesses, presenting 
photospreads/lineups, and the like. 
Sincerely, 
Dr. David H. Dodd, Associate Professor 
Department of Psychology 
Well, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe (1998). Law and human 
behavior. 
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